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Završnica izborne
kampanje za devete parlamentarne izbore na Kosovu od proglašenja nezavisnosti
doživljava svoju kulminaciju.
Međunarodni institut IFIMES je već objavio predizbornu analizu sa naslovom „Parlamentarni izbori na Kosovu
2025: Potreban novi pristup za Kosovo“, link: https://www.ifimes.org/ba/istrazivanja/parlamentarni-izbori-na-kosovu-2025-potreban-novi-pristup-za-kosovo/5439?
(20.01.2025).
Na parlamentarnim izborima učestvuje 28 političkih subjekata, od toga 19
političkih partija, pet koalicija, dvije građanske inicijative i jedan
nezavisni kandidat. Šest je političkih subjekata iz srpske zajednice.
Broj poslaničkih mjesta u Skupštini Kosova je 120, od kojih je 20 poslaničkih
mjesta zagarantirano za pripadnike manjinskih zajednica. Srpskoj zajednici
pripada 10 poslaničkih mandata, bošnjačkoj tri, turskoj dva, Romima (RAE
zajednice) četiri i goranskoj jedno poslaničko mjesto. Izborni prag iznosi
5%.
Posljednja šansa za
političko-kriminalne strukture
U
izbornoj utrci profilira su se tri vodeća politička aktera: Pokret
Samoopredjeljenje (Vetëvendosje - LVV) Albina Kurtija
zajedno sa strankama Alternativa i Guxo, Demokratski savez Kosova (LDK) Lumira Abdixhiku i Demokratska partija Kosova (PDK) Memlija
Krasniqija. Kao
četvrta opcija pokušava u Skupštinu Kosova ući Alijansa za budućnost Kosova
(AAK) kontraverznog Ramusha Haradinaja,
koji se povezuje sa srpskom i albanskom mafijom, čiji korijeni dopiru do
ruske mafije.
Analitičari smatraju, da ne iznenađuju činjenice, da su političko-kriminalne
i mafijaške strukture izdvojile enormne količine novca i resurse za
svrgavanje sa vlasti Albina Kurtija i Pokreta Samoopredjeljenje pri tome
angažirajući i strane plaćenike, koji rade na njegovoj diskreditaciji i
njegovom medijskom ubistvu. Zbog toga su predstojeći parlamentarni izbori
posljednja šansa da se Kosovo obračuna sa svojim „zločincima rata“ i „zločincima mira“,
koji su Kosovo zarobili, opustošili i doveli na sam rub siromaštva u
Evropi. Kurti je zaustavio propadanje Kosova, izvlači zemlju iz kandži mafije
i njegova vlada je jedina koja nije bila podanička ni prema kome. Povratak
političko-kriminalnih i mafijaških struktura na vlast vratilo bi Kosovo
ponovno na početak i stvorilo bi novu neizvjesnost za sve građane u
turbulentnom vremenu i okruženju sa prijetnjom njegovog nestanka. „Zločinci rata“ i „zločinci mira“ ne
smiju i ne mogu odlučivati o budućnosti Kosova. Strani političari i plaćenici
političko-kriminalnih i mafijaških struktura nemaju dovoljnu specifičnu
težinu i respekt na Kosovu, jer narod Kosova ih ne prihvaća, ne osjeća svojim
niti se sa njima može identificirati, pošto se pokušavaju vještački nametnuti
kao posljedica financiranja sumnjivim i kriminalnim novcem. Kosovski glasači
moraju samostalno odlučiti o podršci Kurtiju i o svojoj budućnosti bez
ikakvih pritisaka.
Prihvata li opozicija podjelu
Kosova?
Poznato
je, da se tadašnji predsjednik Kosova Hashim Thaci
(PDK) snažno zalagao za podjelu Kosova i toj njegovoj namjeri tada se jedino
suprotstavio Pokret Samoopredjeljenje. Prešutno je podjelu Kosova podržavao i Demokratski
savez Kosova (LDK), koji se godinama nalazi u krizi i sa smrću Ibrahima Rugove
izgubio je svoj identitet i kredibilitet, a vrhunac degradacije LDK je
dostigao kada je Avdullah Hoti
(LDK) postao privremeni premijer Kosova.
Demokratska partija Kosova (PDK) nikada se nije odrekla političkog nasljeđa
Hashima Thacija ni njegovog sudjelovanja u podjeli Kosova. I sada PDK-om još
uvijek iz pozadine upravljaju političko-kriminalne strukture. PDK nikada nije
postala politička partija u pravom značenju te riječi. Projekt podjele Kosova
je u neposrednoj vezi sa Bosnom i Hercegovinom što će upaliti dodatne alarme
u toj državi.
LDK de nikada nije uspio reformirati i prilagoditi novonastalim okolnostima,
jer je navikao na djelovanje u ilegali, a ne javno i transparentno, a od
smrti Rugove nikada nije imao sreće da izabere pravog lidera.
Analitičari su pojedine čelnike opozicije opisali kao pojedince čiji su
identitet moć i bogatstvo, a ne politički program i ideali za bolje Kosovo.
Upravo Kurtijev program socijalne pravde i jednakosti je u trn u oku tim
strukturama. Njegov reformistički stav doveo ga u sve opasniju poziciju.
Ukoliko se tome doda opasna frakcija unutar pravosudnog sistema, koja u
koordinaciji sa stranim akterima, konstanto priprema i lansira izmišljene
skandale i afere protiv Kurtija i njegovih najbližih saradnika, zbog toga ne
iznenađuje turbulentna izborna kampanja. Ne radi se o običnoj političkoj
konfrontaciji, nego dobro osmišljenoj i koncipiranoj kampanji u centrima
kriminalne i pravosudne moći sa ciljem da potkopa povjerenje javnosti i
oslabi Kurti i Pokret Samoopredjeljenje. Zbog toga je važno da se nastave
temeljite aktivnosti na demontiranju političko-kriminalnih struktura na
Kosovu, koje su još uvijek snažne što vidljivo kroz njihove napore i pokušaje
svrgavanja premijera Kurtija.
Bivši kosovski premijer i predsjednik Hashim Thaci (PDK) održavao je tijesne
veze sa Beogradom, koje ni danas nisu prekinute. Kasnije je te veze razvijao
i snažio svojim kanalima Ramush Haradinaj.
Veliki povratak „Srpske liste“
Manjine moraju birati i predstavljati njihovi autentični
predstavnici. Posebnu pažnju izazivaju izbori u okviru srpske zajednice, koja
bira svojih 10 poslanika.
Očekuje se da Srpska lista, koja je najveća stranka Srba na Kosovu uz podršku
zvaničnog Beograda osvoji svih deset mandata za Skupštinu Kosova. Nakon
parlamentarnih dolaze lokalni izbori, koji su važni za Srbe posebno na
sjeveru Kosova, jer bi se na taj način mogli vratiti u institucije lokalne
samouprave u kojima imaju dominantnu većinu.
U Prištini postoji strah od formiranja Zajednice srpskih opština (ZSO).
Međutim, snažan pritisak međunarodne zajednice dovest će o implementacije
ZSO. Još uvijek nije poznato kako će izgledati Zajednica opština sa srpskom
većinom. ZSO je postala preosjetljivo pitanje za srpsku i albansku stranu.
Proces formiranja ZSO nije moguć bez sprovođenja lokalnih izbora na sjeveru
Kosova.
Povratak stanovništva iz dijaspore
Kosovo
predstavlja svojevrstan fenomen kada je u pitanju povratak mladih obrazovanih
ljudi iz dijaspore. To je važan moment za ekonomski i sveopšti društveni
razvoj i napredak Kosova. Iako na Zapadnom Balkanu bilježimo trend masovnog
iseljavanja stanovništva, ipak neočekivano vizna liberalizacija za Kosovo
zaustavila je val masovnog iseljavanja čemu je doprinijela ne samo politika
vlade nego i sve teža ekonomska situacija u zemljama zapadne Evrope, posebno
Austriji i Njemačkoj.
Veze mafije i pojedinih medija
Upravo
zbog političko-kriminalnih i mafijaških struktura koje su duboko ukorijenjene
na Kosovu nakon izbora biće potrebno sprovesti temeljit proces da se istraže
veze mafije i pojedinih medija, posebno način njihovog financiranja. Istragu
će biti potrebno proširiti i na strane zvaničnike, koji su u funkciji tih
struktura te porijeklo i način njihovog financiranja.
Zanimljivo je da PDK želi povećati ruski utjecaj na Kosovu kao svojevrsnu
osvetu SAD-u zbog odlaska Hashima Thacija na suđenje pred Specijaliziranim
vijećem (KSC-SPO) u Haag, zašto okrivljuju SAD. Još od prije postoje pojedini
opozicioni kosovski lideri, koji tradicionalno gaje odlične odnose sa
Moskvom.
Takozvani „nezavisni“
mediji na Kosovu ne predstavljaju oličenje profesionalizma ili visokih
standarda nego jednostavno predstavljaju ispostave političko-kriminalnih
struktura čime potkopavaju svoj vlastiti kredibilitet. Mora postojati
konstruktivna kritika odnosno nuđenje održivih alternativnih rješenja, dok se
opozicija i njihovi podanički mediji ponašaju na način kojim devalviraju sami
sebe. Umjesto da podignu nivo javnog diskursa, njihova taktika
senzacionalizma, iskrivljavanja činjenica i neprofesionalnog izvještavanja
razvodnila je fokus na legitimne nedostatke vlasti. Takvo ponašanje je
direktno uticalo na sposobnost javnosti da ozbiljno shvati primjedbe i
pritužbe, efektivno štiteći vlast od odgovornosti. Zamutivši vodu javnog
diskursa, ovi akteri su, paradoksalno, omogućili Kurtijevoj vladi nenamjerno
odlaganje od svakog smislenog preispitivanja.
Opozicija se mora suočiti sa vlastitom historijskom hipotekom i greškama. Da
bi krenula naprijed, mora se distancirati od svoje kriminalne prošlosti,
odbaciti sve veze s organiziranim kriminalom i korupcijom i posvetiti se
procesu političke, etičke i društvene obnove Kosova. Ovo nije samo stvar
percepcije, već i neophodnost za obnovu kredibiliteta. Opozicija mora
pokazati da ima program, viziju, integritet i sposobnost da pruži održivu
alternativu sadašnjoj administraciji na Kosovu.
Kosovska opozicija je postala sama sebi najveći neprijatelj. Povjerenje se
stiče vizijom o budućnosti, reformama i realizacijom velikih ideja, borbom
protiv kriminala i korupcije, a ne dosluhom sa ukaljanim novinarima i
kriminalnim nasljeđem.
Kosovo ne može sebi priuštiti stagnaciju, regresivno ili rigidno političko
okruženje. Kredibilna opozicija je ključna za svaku uspješnu demokratiju,
osiguravajući da se vlada izazove i smatra odgovornom i da služi narodu
Kosova. Neuspjeh opozicije da odgovori na sve ove izazove čini medvjeđu
uslugu ne samo njihovim političkim izgledima već i građanima Kosova, koji
zaslužuju daleko viši standard upravljanja i javnog diskursa.
Ukoliko želi da u budućnosti ima važnu ulogu u zemlji, kosovska opozicija
mora jednom zauvijek napustiti svoje uvriježene metode, odbaciti svoje saveze
sa diskreditiranim medijskim akterima i fokusirati se na istinske reforme.
Ovo je jedini način da se ponovo izgradi povjerenje među ljudima i podigne
kvaliteta politike i političke kulture na Kosovu. Sve ostalo će produžiti
trenutni ciklus disfunkcije, ostavljajući zemlju lišenu čvrstih demokratskih
standarda i praksi koje su joj tako očajnički potrebne.
Odgovornost je nemoguća kada su oruđe opozicije laž, skandali i afere, dok
budućnost Kosova zahtjeva potpuni integritet i posvećenost reformama.
Ipak, sam obim dezinformacija i sveprisutna degradacija kvaliteta medija na
Kosovu, povremeno su čak i iskusne promatrače ostavili zbunjenim u pogledu
istine. Ova kakofonija dezinformacija i niskih standarda nije samo briga i
odgovornost novinarske zajednice, radi se o demokratskoj podkapacitiranosti
društva. Funkcionalna demokratija se oslanja na informiranje i dijalog sa
građanima, odgovornu i kredibilnu opoziciju, koja bi držala vlast pod
nadzorom. Kada i opozicija i mediji ne ispunjavaju svoje društvene uloge,
trpi cijeli politički sistem i društvo u cjelini. Demokratija na Kosovu treba
novu političku kulturu.
Kada mediji i opozicija zamagljuju istinu, oni štite vlast, nagrizajući
demokratiju na Kosovu, dok obnova zahtjeva neminovan raskid sa korumpiranom
prošlošću.
Stvaranje
ambijenta za likvidaciju Kurtija?
Zavjera o atentatu na Albina
Kurtija otkrivena je 2021.godine, jer je odbio da igra po starim pravilima na
Kosovu, koje je postavila političko-kriminalna i mafijaška vrhuška
potpomognuta tajkunskom oligarhijom, koja Kosovo drži u svojim kandžama.
Provokacije i napad
u Drenici/Drenas na Albina Kurtija tokom izborne kampanje krajem januara
2025.godine ponovno je otvorilo pitanje ugroženosti života premijera Kosova
Albina Kurtija. Nije nimalo slučajna oštra i prljava retorika, konvergencija
kriminalnih elemenata te političkih i medijskih operativaca, koji stvaraju
ambijent za likvidaciju Kurtija. Situacija je takva da nije samo pitanje da
li će Kurti politički preživjeti, već da li će uopšte fizički preživjeti.
Ako njegovi i neprijatelji Kosova uspiju, neće pasti samo jedan čovjek, već
budućnost zemlje koja se usudila da se oslobodi svoje prošlosti iz kandži
mafije. Kosovo ne bi samo izgubilo premijera, izgubilo bi budućnost za koju
se on borio.
Predstojeći parlamentarni izbori predstavljaju posljednji trzaj i nadu
političko mafijaških struktura i tajkunske oligarhije u obračunu sa Kurtijem
i povratku na vlast.
Ako historija ima ikakvu lekciju koju
može naučiti, to je da se politički lider koji osporava i ugrožava interese
oligarha, kriminalca, političkih mafija i stranih sila nikada ne doživljava
izborni poraz, on ugrožava sebe i postaje njihova meta. Ko želi svom narodu
osigurati budućnost suočava se sa surovom realnošću da sam bude eliminiran.
To je sudbina Albina Kurtija.
Ljubljana/Washington/Bruxelles/Priština, 5.februar 2025
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As Kosovo prepares for its ninth
parliamentary elections since independence, the campaign is heading toward
its culmination.
The International Institute IFIMES has previously published a pre-election
analysis titled “Parliamentary elections in Kosovo 2025: A new approach needed for
Kosovo”, available at: https://www.ifimes.org/en/researches/parliamentary-elections-in-kosovo-2025-a-new-approach-needed-for-kosovo/5443? (24 January 2025).
A total of 28 political entities are participating in the parliamentary
elections, including 19 political parties, five coalitions, two citizens'
initiatives, and one independent candidate. Among them, six represent the
Serbian community.
The Kosovo Assembly has 120 parliamentary seats, with 20 reserved for
minority communities. Of these, 10 are allocated to the Serbian
community, three to the Bosniak community, two to the Turkish community, four
to the Roma (RAE communities), and one to the Gorani community. The electoral
threshold is set at 5%.
The last chance for
political-criminal structures
Three
main political actors have emerged as the front-runners: Albin Kurti’s
Movement for Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje – LVV), backed by the
Alternative and Guxo parties; the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Lumir Abdixhiku; and the Democratic Party of Kosovo
(PDK) under Memli Krasniqi.
A fourth contender, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), is
attempting to secure a place in the Kosovo Assembly under the leadership of
the controversial Ramush Haradinaj, who has been
linked to both Serbian and Albanian organised crime, with connections
extending to Russian criminal networks.
Analysts argue that it comes as no surprise that political-criminal and mafia
structures have poured vast amounts of money and resources into toppling
Albin Kurti and the Movement for Self-Determination, even hiring foreign
mercenaries to discredit him and orchestrate his media assassination. This
makes the upcoming parliamentary elections a last chance for Kosovo to
confront its “war
criminals” and “peace
criminals” — those who have captured the country, plundered it,
and reduced it to the brink of becoming the poorest nation in Europe. Kurti
has halted Kosovo’s decline, is steering the country out of the grip of
organised crime, and leads the only government that has not bowed to external
influences. The return of political-criminal and mafia structures to power
would set Kosovo back to square one, creating new uncertainty for citizens in
an already turbulent period and environment, with the added threat to its
very existence. “War
criminals” and “peace
criminals” must not and cannot decide Kosovo’s future. Foreign
politicians and operatives backed by political-criminal and mafia networks
hold little sway or legitimacy in Kosovo, as they are neither accepted nor
recognised by the people, who do not identify with them. Their influence is
being artificially imposed through funding from dubious and criminal sources.
Kosovo’s voters must independently decide on their support for Kurti and
their future, free from any pressure.
Does the opposition support the
partition of Kosovo?
It
is well known that former Kosovo President Hashim
Thaçi
(PDK) was a strong advocate of Kosovo’s partition, and at the
time, the only political force to oppose his plan was the Movement for
Self-Determination. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) tacitly supported
the partition, having been in crisis for years and having lost its identity
and credibility following the death of Ibrahim Rugova. LDK’s decline culminated when Avdullah Hoti (LDK) became Kosovo’s interim prime
minister.
The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) has never renounced Hashim Thaçi’s
political legacy or his role in the partition of Kosovo. To this day, the
party remains under the influence of political-criminal structures that pull
the strings from behind the scenes. PDK has never truly evolved into a genuine
political party in the full sense of the word. The plan to partition Kosovo
is directly linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina, raising further alarm in that
country.
The LDK has failed to reform or adapt to changing circumstances, having long
been accustomed to operating in secrecy rather than engaging publicly and
transparently. Since Rugova’s death, it has struggled to elect the right
leader.
Analysts describe certain opposition leaders as figures whose identity is
shaped more by power and wealth than by political programmes or a vision for
a better Kosovo. Kurti’s agenda of social justice and equality directly
challenges these structures, with his reformist stance placing him in an
increasingly precarious position. Adding to this is a rogue faction within
the judiciary, working in coordination with foreign actors to systematically
craft and spread fabricated scandals and allegations against Kurti and his
closest allies. This explains the highly charged nature of the election
campaign. What is unfolding is not a routine political confrontation but a
carefully orchestrated campaign, devised within centres of criminal and
judicial power, aimed at eroding public trust and weakening both Kurti and
the Movement for Self-Determination. This is why it is crucial to continue
dismantling Kosovo’s entrenched political-criminal structures, which remain a
formidable force, as evidenced by their persistent efforts to unseat Prime
Minister Kurti.
Former Kosovo Prime Minister and President Hashim Thaçi (PDK) maintained
close ties with Belgrade, which have remained unbroken to this day. Later,
Ramush Haradinaj expanded and reinforced these connections through his own
channels.
The great comeback of the 'Serbian
List'
Minority
communities must be represented by their legitimate, self-elected
representatives. Particular attention is being given to the elections within
the Serbian community, which holds 10 seats in parliament.
The Serbian List, the largest party representing Kosovo Serbs, is expected to
secure all ten seats in the Kosovo Assembly with the backing of official
Belgrade. Following the parliamentary elections, local elections will take
place—an especially significant event for Serbs, particularly in northern
Kosovo, as it could enable their return to local self-government
institutions, where they hold a dominant majority.
Pristina remains wary of the formation of the Association of Serbian
Municipalities (ASM). However, strong international pressure is expected to
drive its implementation forward. The exact structure of the Association of
Serb-Majority Municipalities remains unclear. The ASM has become a highly
sensitive issue for both Serbian and Albanian political actors. Without local
elections in northern Kosovo, its establishment cannot move forward.
Return of the diaspora
Kosovo
represents a unique phenomenon when it comes to the return of young, educated
individuals from the diaspora. This is a crucial factor in Kosovo’s economic
and overall social development. While mass emigration remains a dominant trend
across the Western Balkans, the unexpected visa liberalisation for Kosovo has
halted the outflow of people. This is driven not only by government policies
but also by the increasingly difficult economic situation in Western European
countries, particularly Austria and Germany.
Ties between the mafia and certain
media outlets
Given
the deep-rooted presence of political-criminal and mafia structures in
Kosovo, a comprehensive post-election effort will be necessary to investigate
their connections to certain media outlets, particularly their sources of
funding. The inquiry should also extend to foreign officials who operate in
service of these structures, scrutinising both the origins and channels of
their financial support.
Interestingly, the PDK is seeking to expand Russian influence in Kosovo as a
form of retaliation against the United States for Hashim Thaçi’s trial before
the Specialist Chambers (KSC-SPO) in The Hague, for which they blame the US.
Moreover, some opposition leaders in Kosovo have long maintained strong ties
with Moscow.
Kosovo’s so-called "independent"
media are far from embodying professionalism or high journalistic standards;
instead, they function as mere outposts of political-criminal structures,
eroding their own credibility in the process. There must be constructive
criticism, offering viable alternative solutions, whereas the opposition and
its compliant media behave in a way that devalues their standing. Rather than
elevating public discourse, their reliance on sensationalism, factual
distortions, and unprofessional reporting has blurred the focus on the
government’s legitimate shortcomings. Such behaviour has directly affected
the public’s ability to take their criticism and objections seriously,
effectively shielding the government from accountability. By muddying the
waters of public discourse, these actors have, paradoxically, provided
Kurti’s government an unintended reprieve from meaningful scrutiny.
The opposition must confront its own historical burden and past mistakes. To
move forward, it must break away from its criminal past, sever all ties with
organised crime and corruption, and fully commit to Kosovo’s political,
ethical, and social renewal. This is not just a matter of perception—it is a
prerequisite for restoring credibility. The opposition must demonstrate that
it has a clear programme, a strong vision, integrity, and the capability to
present a viable alternative to Kosovo’s current administration.
Kosovo’s opposition has become its own worst enemy. Trust is built through a
clear vision for the future, reforms, and the implementation of bold ideas,
alongside a genuine fight against crime and corruption—not through backroom
dealings with discredited journalists and a legacy of criminal entanglements.
Kosovo cannot afford stagnation or a regressive and rigid political
environment. A credible opposition is essential to any thriving democracy,
ensuring that the government is challenged, held accountable, and truly
serves the people of Kosovo. The opposition’s failure to meet these
challenges is not only a disservice to its own political prospects but also
to the citizens of Kosovo, who deserve far higher standards of governance and
public discourse.
If the Kosovo opposition hopes to remain a key political force in the future,
it must permanently abandon its entrenched methods, break ties with
discredited media figures, and shift its focus to meaningful reforms. Only in
this way can it restore public trust and raise the quality of policies and
political culture in Kosovo. Any other course of action will only perpetuate
the current cycle of dysfunction, leaving the country deprived of the strong
democratic standards and practices it so desperately needs.
Accountability cannot exist when the opposition’s main instruments are lies,
scandals, and manufactured controversies, while Kosovo’s future hinges on
integrity and a steadfast commitment to reforms.
However, the sheer volume of disinformation and the widespread decline in
media quality in Kosovo have, at times, left even seasoned observers unsure
of what is true. This cacophony of misinformation and low journalistic
standards is not just a concern for the media community—it reflects a broader
democratic deficiency in society. A well-functioning democracy depends on access
to information, civic dialogue, and a responsible, credible opposition that
holds the government accountable. When both the opposition and the media fail
in their societal roles, the entire political system and society as a whole
suffer the consequences. Kosovo’s democracy needs a new political culture.
When the media and the opposition obfuscate the truth, they inadvertently
shield those in power, further corroding Kosovo’s democracy. Genuine renewal
requires an unavoidable break from a corrupt past.
Creating
an atmosphere for Kurti’s elimination?
A plot to assassinate Albin Kurti
was uncovered in 2021 after he refused to play by the old rules in Kosovo
which were set by the political-criminal and mafia elite backed by a tycoon
oligarchy that holds the country in its clutches.
The provocation and attack on Kurti in Drenica/Drenas during the election
campaign in late January 2025 have reignited concerns over the security of
Kosovo’s Prime Minister. The harsh and dirty rhetoric, the convergence of criminal
elements with political and media operatives—none of this is coincidental.
Together, they are creating an atmosphere for Kurti’s elimination. The stakes
are no longer just about his political survival but about whether he will
survive at all.
If his adversaries and the enemies of Kosovo succeed, it will not be just one
man who falls—it will be the future of a country that dared to break free
from its past and the grip of the mafia. Kosovo would not only lose its prime
minister; it would lose the very future he fought for.
The upcoming parliamentary elections mark the final desperate push of
political-mafia structures and the tycoon oligarchy in their attempt to
remove Kurti and reclaim power.
If history teaches us anything, it is that a political leader who disrupts
and threatens the interests of oligarchs, criminals, political mafias, and
foreign powers is never simply voted out—he puts himself in danger and
becomes their target. Those who strive to secure a future for their nation
must face the harsh reality that they themselves may be eliminated. Such is
the fate of Albin Kurti.
Ljubljana/Washington/Bruxelles/Priština,
5 February 2025
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